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Abstract
The interaction of two binary variables, assumed to be empirical observations, has
three degrees of freedom when expressed as a matrix of frequencies. Usually, the
size of causal influence of one variable on the other is calculated as a single value,
as increase in recovery rate for a medical treatment, for example. We examine what
is lost in this simplification, and propose using two interface constants to represent
positive and negative implications separately. Given certain assumptions about non-
causal outcomes, the set of resulting epistemologies is a continuum. We derive a variety
of particular measures and contrast them with the one-dimensional index.
1 Introduction
Everyday life depends on assumptions about cause and effect. Flipping a switch causes
a light to come on, and turning a key causes an automobile’s engine to start. A modern
account of causality and its relationship to mathematical probability and statistics can be
found in the work of Judea Pearl, including [7] and [6], and his development of structural
analysis in [8] provides a logical framework for causal reasoning. The aim of the present
work is to focus on the simplest-possible causal connections: the summary of an exper-
imental interaction between two binary variables. Following Pearl’s distinction between
purely observational data and experimental data, we will generally assume that a causal
variable A was manipulated randomly, with do(A = 1) or do(A = 0), in order to see what
effect it has B. If we are directly causing A = 0 and A = 1 using a random assignment,
this allows us to rule out (with probability approaching one) a third confounding variable
C from simultaneously controlling A and B to give the false appearance of causality.
Assessing the impact of A on B can be done in many ways, including probability-raising
and odds ratios. An attempt to catalog and compare these can be found in [3]. Probability-
raising is intuitive: the magnitude calculated from is the probability Pr (B|A) versus either
Pr (B) or Pr (B|A′) [4], where the prime means complement or logical negation. As an
example: can a neighborhood baseball game cause a window of a house bordering the
outfield to break? Were we to conduct an experiment to determine the answer, we would
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randomly assign baseball games to fields in various neighborhoods, and measure the break-
age of windows relative to a control group of houses that bordered baseball-less fields. If
we saw an increase in the percentage of fractured panes in the with-baseball treatment
group, we might conclude that this additional misfortune was caused by the games nearby.
An “increase in probability” as a marker for causality is reasonable, but not entirely sat-
isfactory, because it relies on a background rate of window-breakage. In neighborhoods
without glass windows, it would be undetectable, for example, even though the causal
power of baseballs over window panes would presumably be unaltered. This example helps
distinguish between the statistical context that an experiment is performed in and the
presumed causal effect that we are interested in. The former is likely to change unless we
are dealing with fundamental properties of the universe. Electrons are interchangeable as
units of experimentation, but houses and their windows are all different.
The approach we take here is that the assertion of causality based on observations is
a conversion from observational data, which is statistical in nature, into language-based
assertions, which are logical in nature. The intention is to inform discrete decisions like
“take the medicine or not” rather than “what percentage of the pill should I chop off and
swallow?”. We therefore take causal inferences to be specific and universal, but subject
to masking by other causes. We might say that “light switches always turn lights on”,
and then account for the exceptions as part of the particular context. Burned out bulbs,
power outages, malfunctioning switches, bad wiring, and so on, are cases of the causality
being masked by context, not violating the causality itself. In the present work we will use
the word “confusion” to denote contextual interference with causes, which happens with
some estimated probability. The estimate will only be valid for the context in which it was
gathered.
If causality is treated as a strict logical implication A ⇒ B, then exceptions have to
be accounted for in other factors. If A increases the probability of B, this is an indication
of a cause at work, but the probability increase is not the cause itself. In the example,
the baseball game probably does increase the probability of a broken window, but it is
the baseball itself that does the breaking. In this way we parse the situation as the game
increasing the probability of a causal event, but if it does occur the implication from
[baseball hits window] to [window breaks] is certain. The probability increase depends on
context, but the causal implication does not. The former depends on a list of sufficient
conditions (for windows breaking) that were present in the experimental samples, whereas
the latter is itself a sufficient condition. In this case, other sufficient conditions would
include sonic booms, giant hail, a rock thrown by a lawn mower, an accident inside the
house, a large bird flying into the window, and large explosions nearby. Some of these
will be rare, and it is unlikely that our experiment will sample them all, and even in the
unfortunate circumstance that we did sample them all, they are not likely to recur with
stable frequencies as the world evolves. We can think of all these sufficient causes as binary
random variables that are constructed by the unfolding of time. They may be stochastic
with predictable regularity or they may better thought of as the result of a very complex
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computing machine that occasionally produces a mark on a tape. The former context
can be treated well with parametric statistics. For example, mean and variation can help
understand crop yield under controlled cultivation. On the other hand, the hallmark of
intelligence (or just computation) is the chaining together of unlikely events, so that a given
sequence of cause-and-effect may only happen once. As an example, the internal state of a
given desktop computer be unique in the past and future history of the universe, and it is
not best understood as random but as the consequence of a large number of deterministic
logical operations, which has severe logical limits (the Halting Problem and its kin) [9].
If A is sufficient for B, then evidence for other sufficient conditions comes to use through
B ⇒ A. In the earlier example, this converse is [window breaks] implies [baseball game],
which we use in the contrapositive form [no baseball game] implies [window doesn’t break]
because the variable under experimental control is the presence of the game. We will
call this implication “negative causality”. This term is loaded with philosophical connota-
tions that we will not delve into [2], but instead just use it as a convenient name for the
converse of “positive causality”. If we only observe windows breaking in the presence of
baseball games, then the contexts of those experiments may exclude other sufficient causes.
Negative causality is of interest because lack of it can mask evidence for positive causal-
ity. For example, if the baseball games are played on the coast, and all the windows are
hurricane-proof, this fact will mask the causality of baseballs breaking normal windows.
The associated logic would be [baseball hits window] ⇒ [window breaks] OR [hurricane-
proof windows] OR ... . Low negative causality points to other sufficient causes, whereas
a value of unity means that the context of the experiment did not show evidence of any
other causes of B, leaving us to conclude that (in context) A⇔ B.
Binary relationships of the type under consideration here can be considered categorical,
and a comprehensive introduction to the analysis of categorical variables can be found in
[1]; a number of ways of calculating the influence of A on B can be found there. The
A × B interaction tables are also put to use in the classification problem of A predicting
B, which differentiates true positive and negative from false positive and negative cases for
(often) purely observational data [5]. Although we have to give up causality, the techniques
described in the following sections can also be used for observational data. See in particular
Section 6.3.
For simplicity, we will assume that the number of observations is large, and work directly
with frequencies instead of counts. We organize these into a matrix
P =
[
p00 p01
p10 p11
]
which sums to one, and where the row index is the value of A and the column index is
the value of B. We will usually assume that we have experimental control over A, and
that for each observation that provides information for P , the observation of B follows the
observation of A in time in some reasonable way. It will be convenient to refer to column
and row sums of the P matrix in a compact way, and we will use a slightly modified form
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of the notation in [1], where the sum of the two i row elements will be denoted pi∗ and the
sum over column j as p∗j.
As an example, we imagine a drug test with a trial group A = 1 and a randomly-selected
control group A = 0, testing to see if patients recover within a certain period (B = 1) or
fail to recover in that period (B = 0). Assume that the experiment yields the frequencies
P1 =
[
.23 .25
.20 .32
]
.
What should we conclude about the effect of the treatment? The matrix has four
elements, but because they sum to one, there are three degrees of freedom. Therefore, a
single index of the effect of the drug therefore cannot tell us everything about the drug’s
effect and the content in which it happens. Nevertheless, we might begin with the difference
between the success rate with treatment and the success rate without, which we will denote
as εˆ throughout, as a point of reference for other measures we will derive. We have
εˆ =
p11
p10 + p11
− p01
p00 + p01
=
p11
p1∗
− p01
p0∗
(1)
=
p00p11 − p01p10
(p00 + p01)(p10 + p11)
=
p00p11 − p01p10
p0∗p1∗
(2)
It is easy to show that εˆǫ[−1, 1]. It is easy to show that the numerator is the determinant
of the matrix, which is also the covariance of A,B. The denominator is the variance of A.
We have
εˆ =
Cov(A,B)
V ar(A)
.
A couple of other connections are worth mentioning. If we view B as a predictor of A
(zero predicts zero and one predicts one), then the area under the true positive versus false
positive curve (the so-called ROC curve) is 1/2 + εˆ/2. Additionally, εˆ is the slope of the
regression line for B as a predictor of A.
In the example, εˆ ≈ .10 meaning that 10% more subjects recovered with treatment
than without. It can be the case that the effect is negative, which we can see by reversing
the columns of the matrix to get
[
.23 .25
.20 .32
]
, with associated εˆ ≈ −.10. This would be the
case if the treatment did actual harm by reducing the chance of recovery. Rather than
using negatives to quantify effects, we will choose to think of this as a semantic problem
and avoid it in the following way. Without loss of generality, we can change a negative εˆ
into a positive one by inverting the output designations, swapping the meaning of B = 0
and B = 1. As an example, a vaccine’s effect is intended to be negative in the logical
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sense: it prevents a condition rather than causing one. In this case, we could set A = 1
for vaccinated subjects, A = 0 for the others, and then use B = 0 to categorize subjects
who contracted the disease the vaccine is intended to prevent, with B = 1 the remainder
(those who did not contract it). Assuming that the vaccine actually does have the desired
effect, we will have εˆ > 0. Mathematically, this is a permutation matrix on the columns
(i.e., post-multiplied). We will consider any such transformation already accomplished, so
that we can assume the the interaction matrix P always has p00p11 − p01p10 ≥ 0. When
we want to distinguish these cases of “backwards” variables from the “forwards” ones, we
will call them anti-causal.
Next we examine a weakness of εˆ as an measure of influence of A over B. The matrix
P2 =
[
.05 .45
0 .50
]
has εˆ ≈ .10, about the same as the previous example. The two situations represented
by P1 and P2 are qualitatively different, however. If we were just looking at the bottom
rows of these matrices (the cases where the treatment was applied), we would consider
P2 to be superior to P1, because 100% of the treatments seemed to be successful in the
former. This detail is lost when we compress the effectiveness of the treatment into a single
index. We might try to create a complementary second index that measures the effect of
non-treatment. A familiar example will underscore this point.
Residential light switches are designed to be simple interfaces: one position (“up”)
turns the light on, and the other (“down”) turns it off. If we built an interaction table like
P1 and P2 based on observations of switch and light, it might look like
P3 =
[
.45 0
.02 .53
]
,
where p10 represents the frequency that the switch is up, but the light remains off. This
could be because of a burned-out bulb or power outage. A simple model of the light’s state
as influenced by the switch, bulb, and power state can be written in Boolean algebra as
L = SBP.
Negating this gives us the equivalent statement about L′,
L′ = S′ +B′ + P ′.
The off state of L is controlled by an OR relationship to the down position of S, whereas
the on state is complicated by influences beyond the control of the switch. In this sense,
light switches are better at turning lights off than turning them on in this model because
S′ ⇒ L′ but S ; L. Other asymmetrical causes can easily be found. Consuming poison
causes one to die, but abstaining from it doesn’t cause one to live (otherwise ambulance
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crews would carry around vials of the stuff so they could save accident victims by not giving
them poison). On the other hand, there are causal relationships that work both directions,
and they are valuable for understanding and creating the world. Communications systems
are built on if-and-only-if relationships between signal and intent, like the tap of a telegraph
key and the resulting “dit” on the other end of the wire.
In order to capture asymmetrical causality we will look for positive effects and negative
effects as separate measures. This amounts to two questions: “How much control does the
switch have over turning the light off?” and “How much control does the switch have over
turning the light on?” We will refer to these two parameters together as an interface, with
two interface coefficients (ε0, ε1) that measure these respective types of control.
2 Interfaces and Indexes
An elevator is designed to be an interface that allows us to get to some desired floor in
a building. For the sake of illustration, let our input A = 1 be the state of our pressing
the button numbered with our floor, and B = 1 the state of exiting the elevator car onto
that floor within one minute after entering the elevator. If we are alone in the building,
the elevator acts like a perfect interface; we will get to out floor (quickly) if and only if we
press the button. A matrix of experimental frequencies would be diagonal. In this case,
we have full control, and it is natural to expect that (ε0, ε1) = (1, 1).
If the building is occupied with other travelers, there may be occasions when our ride
is slowed appreciably, so that we experience instances of B = 0 (not arriving within one
minute) even though we pressed the button (do(A = 1)). On the other hand, if we don’t
press the button (do(A = 0)), there is still a chance that the car will stop on our floor
because either other passengers press our button, or someone on that floor signals a stop.
After repeated trips up and down, careful observation might reveal an interaction matrix
like
[
.3 .2
.05 .45
]
. We would expect in this case that the positive effect of pressing the button
is diminished but still strong, but the negative effect of refraining is weakening faster. ε0
and ε1 are both less than one now.
Finally, imagine that a convention on parenting has arrived at the hotel, bringing
along their children who have come for behavioral training. Some of these young people
like to amuse themselves by pressing all the buttons on the elevator. This happens very
frequently when we ride, slowing our ascent appreciably. Now the interface is broken (our
act of button-pressing has no positive or negative control over the outcome of arriving
within a minute), and the matrix could be
[
.25 .25
.25 .25
]
, in which case we would expect that
(ε0, ε1) = (0, 0).
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Informally, we are thinking that the interface comprises
ε0 : the contextual probability of A
′ ⇒ B′
ε1 : the contextual probability of A⇒ B.
A first approach might be to use εˆ to define a complementary measure of negative causation
εˇ, with
εˇ =
p00
p00 + p01
− p10
p10 + p11
=
p00p11 − p01p10
(p00 + p01)(p10 + p11)
= εˆ.
This shows that εˆ is a symmetric measure of causality, not distinguishing between positive
and negative cause. To differentiate these, we can begin by decomposing the original
matrix into something like signal and noise. If an interface comprises a diagonal matrix
of positive and negative cause, then subtracting this from the original matrix must leave
the observations not explained by the interface, which we will call the confusion matrix C.
One approach might be to decompose example P1 into[
.23 .25
.20 .32
]
=
[
0 .25
.20 0
]
+
[
.23 0
0 .32
]
,
with the confusion matrix being the left summand and the interface the right. This entails
a particular epistemological choice, wherein we assume that all cases can be explained by a
causal variable A and an unknown anti-causal variable. In terms of the drug test scenario,
it means that we consider all the treatment cases that recovered to be the sole effect of the
drug, and all the cases where the patient did not take the drug and did not recover to be the
sole effect of withholding treatment. This stance means that we take the effectiveness of
the administration of the drug (do(A)) to behave like an indicator for some third variable.
For example, if the drug acts like a perfect interface for subjects with a particular genetic
condition and has the reverse effect on anyone else. Then the effectiveness of the drug on
a case-by-case basis gives the same information as a genetic test for this condition.
Anti-causal subsets always exist if the subjects are distinguishable one from another.
We can trivially create such a subset post facto by listing suitable observations. The
existence of a generalizable index that points to an anti-causal subset before the experiment
is more interesting.
As an example, a light switch may produce an interaction with a ceiling light like[
.25 .25
.25 .25
]
, from which we may conclude that the switch has no influence over the light at
all. Perhaps it is the wrong switch for that light. However, if we learn of a second switch
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wired as a “two-way” arrangement (often found at the top and bottom of a stairway), the
decomposition [
.25 .25
.25 .25
]
=
[
0 .25
.25 0
]
+
[
.25 0
0 .25
]
makes perfect sense as a union of anti-causal and causal subsets. Two experimenters,
unaware of the wiring or each other, could simultaneously gather switch/light data and
conclude that these were independent of one another. The P matrix by itself does not
contain enough information to identify anti-causal indexes.
We turn now to a weaker assumption about confusion. Rather than assigning maximum
power to the putative cause A, we will assume that some portion of the observations is
distributed independently of A.
3 Preliminary Confusion
Because we already have a workable idea of an interface using the symmetric εˆ, we can
subtract that effect from the original matrix and see what “confusion” looks like in this
case. We use the following relationship to define the confusion matrix C:[
p00 p01
p10 p11
]
= (1− εˆ)
[
c00 c01
c10 c11
]
+ εˆ
[
p0∗ 0
0 p1∗
]
.
The idea is that the coefficient εˆ represents the amount of causal control A exerts over B,
and subtracting the appropriate diagonal matrix leaves the left-over “independent confu-
sion”. This decomposition has some nice properties.
Proposition 1. For εˆ > 0, the confusion matrix C is a frequency matrix.
Proof. We have to show that the elements of C are in [0, 1] and that they sum to one. The
second part is easy, since we are using εˆ to create a convex combination that sums to the
original matrix P . Since both P and
[
p0∗ 0
0 p1∗
]
sum to one, C must also. For the rest,
observe that
C =
1
1− εˆ
[
p00 − εˆp0∗ p01
p10 p11 − εˆp1∗
]
=
1
1− εˆ
[
p0∗
(
1− p11
p1∗
)
p01
p10
p1∗p01
p0∗
]
, (3)
where the second line is obtained by substituting the definition of εˆ from (1). The matrix
entries are all obviously non-negative. Since the whole matrix sums to one, no single
element can be more than one.
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Proposition 2. The confusion matrix C has determinant zero.
Proof. Using (3), we need to show that p01p10 = p0∗(1 − p11p1∗ )
p1∗p01
p0∗
. Expanding the right
hand side gives us
p0∗
(
1− p11
p1∗
)
p1∗p01
p0∗
= (p1∗ − p11)p01
= p01p10 as desired.
Another way to say that C has determinant zero is to say that one row (or column) is
a multiple of the other. Because it is a probability matrix, this also means that it can be
decomposed into an outer product of two distributions
C =
[
σ0∗
σ1∗
] [
σ∗0 σ∗1
]
,
where σ is a row or column sum, following our notation. An interaction matrix that is
the product of its marginal distributions is what we would expect from two independent
random variables. Therefore, we can interpret C as the frequency of interaction between A
and B that is outside the control of the interface, which seems appropriate for a confusion
matrix. We will use this idea to generalize to two interface constants, and decompose P as[
p00 p01
p10 p11
]
=
[
1− ε0 0
0 1− ε1
] [
c00 c01
c10 c11
]
+
[
ε0 0
0 ε1
] [
p0∗ 0
0 p1∗
]
, (4)
with ε0 as the interface constant that represents the effect of withholding treatment (or
whatever A = 0 can be interpreted as), and ε1 the positive effect of A = 1 on B = 1. We
will require that the C matrix be the product of its marginals, so that it can be thought
of as a distribution of two independent random variables. The interface coefficients we
interpret as the probability of a causal event (positive or negative). The multiplication of
the εs by row sums p0∗ and p1∗ make these coefficients invariant under row-scaling. Because
this is considered to be experimental data, we control the relative frequency of A = 1 and
A = 0, and the measure of causality should be independent of that.
The scaling effect of 1 − ε and ε on the matrix decomposition of P can be thought of
as a uniform random variable U that “decides” whether causality due to our intervention,
rather than confusion from some masking effect, determines the outcome. When we apply
the cause A = 0, if U > ε0, then the causal implication makes B = 0, and otherwise, we
take our chances with the confusion matrix (which may still end up with B = 0 from other
causes). Together these conditional interactions account for all the observations found in
P , and the theoretical interest is in systematically subtracting out the interface (causal)
effects from what we might consider environmental noise.
So far, we only have one measure, εˆ of causality. Next we show that there is a continuum
of possible measures.
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4 More Varieties of Confusion
The condition that C be a product of its margins can be used to derive a relationship for
the interface coefficients, since[
1− ε0 0
0 1− ε1
] [
c00 c01
c10 c11
]
=
[
p00 − ε0p0∗ p01
p10 p11 − ε1p1∗
]
,
but the row-scaling of C won’t affect its singularity, so we want the determinant of the
right side to be zero, or
(p00 − ε0p0∗)(p11 − ε1p1∗) = p01p10 (5)
We can write ε1 as a function of ε0 with
ε1 =
1
p1∗
(
p11 − p01p10
p00 − ε0p0∗
)
, (6)
which is a hyperbola (unless p01p10 = 0, in which case it is vertical and horizontal line
segments) with its lower half having x-intercept and y-intercept given by
x0 =
p00p11 − p01p10
p0∗p11
=
Cov(A,B)
p0∗p11
y0 =
p00p11 − p01p10
p1∗p00
=
Cov(A,B)
p1∗p00
.
The upper half of the hyperbola passes through (1, 1), although that is only a valid
solution when the original matrix is diagonal. This is, however, convenient, since it rules
out any other solutions on the upper curve of the hyperbola. Note that the bounds shown
above do not limit the interface coefficients from attaining all the values on the lower half of
the hyperbola in the first quadrant, framed by the intercepts. This gives us a neat picture
of all possible independent-confusion epistemologies. Two examples are shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Interface plots for
[
.23 .25
.20 .32
]
(solid) and
[
.40 .10
.10 .40
]
(dashed), with εˆ identified.
The relationship in (6) allows us to think of a causal relationship between binary A
and B as a continuum that we choose from based on some philosophical principle.
Definition 1. An interface epistemology is method of uniquely assigning interface coeffi-
cients (ε0, ε1), so that (4) holds when p00p11 − p01p10 ≥ 0 .
Next we do some calculations that will simplify working with independent-confusion
interfaces.
5 Normalizing P
The decomposition (4) leaves one degree of freedom in identifying a particular (ε0, ε1) for a
given P . In this section we show that this amounts to the choice of the column distribution
of C, and derive some consequences of that fact.
It is natural to assume that C is of the form
C =
[
σ0p0∗ σ1p0∗
σ0p1∗ σ1p1∗
]
,
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where (σ0, σ1) forms a distribution. Notice that in this instance we have[
p00/p0∗ p01/p0∗
p10/p1∗ p11/p1∗
]
=
[
(1− ε0)σ0 + ε0 (1− ε0)σ1
(1− ε1)σ0 (1− ε1)σ1 + ε1
]
=
[
ε0σ1 + σ0 σ1 − ε0σ1
σ0 − ε1σ0 ε1σ0 + σ1
]
,
from which we can use the first row to get the system
p00/p0∗ =ε0σ1 + σ0
p01/p0∗ =σ1 − ε0σ1.
Adding these two equations gives
p00 + p01
p0∗
=σ1 + σ0
1 = 1.
A similar calculation works for the second row, showing that any distribution (σ0, σ1) leads
to a self-consistent definition of the interface coefficients, with
ε0 =1− p01
p0∗σ1
ε1 =1− p10
p1∗σ0
.
This result can be used in the other direction as well, to find the useful lower limits of
(σ0, σ1), at the intercepts in the ǫ0-ǫ1 first quadrant.
0 =1− p01
p0∗σ1
implies that
σ0 =
p01
p0∗
, and
0 =1− p10
p1∗σ0
implies that
σ1 =
p10
p1∗
.
This result demonstrates that the interface decomposition in (4) only depends on the
row-normalized version of P . We can rewrite the relationship between interface coefficients
in (1) as
ε1 =
p11
p1∗
− p10
p1∗
(
p01/p0∗
p00/p0∗ − ε0
)
. (7)
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Generally, these are called right-stochastic matrices, and are often associated with
Markov Chains. We can now write a simpler version of the interface decomposition, using
a new row-normalized matrix of observations, as[
r00 r01
r10 r11
]
:=
[
p00/p0∗ p01/p0∗
p10/p1∗ p11/p1∗
]
,
so that [
r00 r01
r10 r11
]
=
[
1− ε0 0
0 1− ε1
] [
σ0 σ1
σ0 σ1
]
+
[
ε0 0
0 ε1
]
. (8)
This can also be written in outer-product form as[
r00 r01
r10 r11
]
=
[
1− ε0
1− ε1
] [
σ0 σ1
]
+
[
ε0 0
0 ε1
]
.
The interface relationship becomes
ε1 = r11 − r10r01
r00 − ε0 ,
with
ε0ǫ
[
0,
r00r11 − r01r10
r11
]
(9)
ε1ǫ
[
0,
r00r11 − r01r10
r00
]
(10)
(note that the numerators can be written in other forms, such as the surprisingly simple
r00 − r10), derivable from
ε0 =1− r01
σ1
(11)
ε1 =1− r10
σ0
, (12)
where the distribution limits (always subject to σ0 + σ1 = 1) are
σ0ǫ[r10, r00]
σ1ǫ[r01, r11].
It will also be handy to have the inverse relationships for (11) and (12) at hand:
σ0 =
r10
1− ε1
σ1 =
r01
1− ε0 .
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The decomposition (8) comprises a bijection from R into a set of hyperbolas with the
intercepts given in (9) and (10). The curve is therefore uniquely identified with the given
R, but we are after a property of R (causality with B). This depends on what we believe
about the distribution of B that is not caused by A. Given a choice for the confusion
distribution σ1, we can identify particular values for the interface coefficients.
6 A Selection of Epistemologies
In this section we will look at several choices for (σ0, σ1) and the resulting interfaces. We
can proceed by first choosing (ε0, ε1) and then calculating the confusion matrix, or in
the other direction, by assuming something about the distribution of confusion, and then
calculating the interface coefficients.
6.1 The Symmetric Interface
We begin with an analysis of the one-dimensional effect parameter found in (2), to identify
the implicit assumption about confusion. By setting ε0 = ε1 = εˆ = r11 − r01 in (11) and
(12), we find that
(σ0, σ1) =
(
r01
r01 + r10
,
r10
r01 + r10
)
.
Adopting this model implies the belief that future interface errors will be distributed like
the anti-causal observations counted in p01 and p10.
There are other interesting relationships to this coefficient, including εˆ = detR, the
matrix determinant, which in this case is also equal to r00 + r11 − 1 = trace (R) − 1.
Moreover, the two eigenvalues of R are 1 and εˆ.
Taking the specific example we began with, we can understand the example
P1 =
[
.23 .25
.20 .32
]
as a row-normalized decomposition[
.535 .465
.439 .561
]
=
[
.904 0
0 .904
] [
.485 .515
.485 .515
]
+
[
.096 0
0 .096
]
,
with εˆ ≈ .096.
Next we will try out a new idea for deriving the corresponding interface coefficients.
6.2 Maximum Cause
The total explanatory power of the interface is ε0 + ε1, so it is of interest to see what the
confusion distribution looks like if we maximize this sum. To find it, we can use (7) to find
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where the slope of the ε1 = f(ε0) curve is −1. Differentiating gives
d
dε0
(
r11 − r01r10
r00 − ε0
)
= −
(
r01r10
r00 − ε0
)2
,
so to maximize the sum we want
ε0 =r00 −√r01r10
ε1 =r11 −√r01r10.
Substituting this into (11) and (12) and solving gives
σ0 =
√
r10√
r01 +
√
r10
σ1 =
√
r01√
r01 +
√
r10
,
which looks like a variation of the symmetric εˆ interface we just saw. Both of them rely on
the maximum size of potential anti-causes as the basis to calculate the confusion matrix,
which is what limits the size of the interface coefficients.
6.3 Classification Confusion
It may be that the distribution of B is fixed, and for that reason we insist that (σ0, σ1) =
(p∗0, p∗1). This would be the case for a classification problem, for example, where A is not
causing B, but only used as an indicator function to identify it. We might use this as an
exploratory tool to look for causal relationships in survey data. In this case, knowing the
row-normed matrix is not enough: we have to have the original distribution of B as well.
The interface coefficients are
ε0 =1− r01
p∗1
ε1 =1− r10
p∗0
.
These coefficients can be understood as the relative difference between the original
matrix and the product of its margins. This is easier to see in the form
ε1 =
p1∗p∗0 − p10
p1∗p∗0
,
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which can also be written
=
(p10 + p11)(p00 + p10)− p10
p1∗p∗0
=
p10p00 + p
2
10
+ p11p00 + p11p10 − p10
p1∗p∗0
=
p10(p00 + p10 + p11 − 1) + p11p00
p1∗p∗0
=
p11p00 − p10p01
p1∗p∗0
=
Cov(A,B)
p1∗p∗0
.
Similarly,
ε0 =
Cov(A,B)
p0∗p∗1
.
A nice feature of this epistemology is that the geometric average of interface coefficients is
the correlation coefficient, because
ε0ε1 =
Cov(A,B)Cov(A,B)
(p0∗p1∗)(p∗0p∗1)
=
Cov(A,B)2
V ar(A)V ar(B)
.
There is also a relationship to the Symmetric Interface εˆ in that if we compute it for both
R and its transpose, the geometric average of these is also the correlation coefficient.
For our example
[
.23 .25
.20 .32
]
, we decompose the resulting R as
[
.535 .465
.439 .561
]
=
[
.894 0
0 .914
] [
.48 .52
.48 .52
]
+
[
.106 0
0 .086
]
.
6.4 Untreated Confusion
Some may object to the Classification Confusion, because they want to single out the
“treatment” case A = 1 as a new effect, and only use untreated observations coming from
the A = 0 observations as a basis for confusion. This is the maximum value ε1 can be, and
it gives us a philosophical justification for the y-intercept on the interface curve. In this
case we have [
r00 r01
r10 r11
]
=
[
1− ε0 0
0 1− ε1
] [
r00 r01
r00 r01
]
+
[
ε0 0
0 ε1
]
,
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which gives us
ε0 =1− r01
r01
=0
ε1 =1− r10
r00
,
which is the maximum value possible.
6.5 Natural Confusion
Recalling that the determinant-zero condition on the confusion matrix in (5) is
(p00 − ε0p0∗)(p11 − ε1p1∗) = p01p10,
it is natural to assign
p00 − ε0p0∗ =p01
p11 − ε1p1∗ =p10,
so that
ε0 =
p00 − p01
p0∗
=r00 − r01
ε1 =r11 − r10
with resulting confusion
σ0 =
r10
1− r11 + r10
=
r10
r10 + r10
=1/2
σ1 =1/2.
If we chose the other natural factorization (subtracting columns instead of rows), we
get
p00 − ε0p0∗ =p10
p11 − ε1p1∗ =p01,
so that
ε0 =r00 − r10
ε1 =r11 − r01,
which we recognize as our starting point: the Symmetric Interface.
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6.6 Graphical Comparison
We now have a catalog of a few possible epistemologies, and it is interesting to see how
they compare for different types of P matrices. For each of the graphs below, the labels
on points are indexed by:
S Symmetric Interface from Section 6.1
M Maximum Cause from Section 6.2
C Classification Confusion from Section 6.3
U Untreated Confusion from Section 6.4
N Natural Confusion from section 6.5
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
ε0
ε 1
S
C
M
N
U
Figure 2: Interfaces for
[
.4 0
.2 .4
]
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Figure 3: Interfaces for
[
.40 .10
.25 .25
]
7 Final Remarks
The preceding discussion shows that considering the respective probabilities of A⇔ B has
a richness than cannot be captured with a single index of A⇒ B causality. For example,
we saw in Section 6.3 that the correlation coefficient on two binary variables can be seen as
an average causal index, and that we can decompose it, given certain assumptions, into a
forward and reverse implication with associated probabilities. We also showed how use of a
usual measure of effect, εˆ, makes implicit assumptions about the distribution of non-causal
results, and is agnostic about the direction of logical implication.
In practice, the complex systems we rely on usually have logic that resembles an in-
terface. We depend on causalities of the form [driver brakes sharply] ⇔ [vehicle stops
suddenly], and this becomes a simplified operating assumption. Each direction of the im-
plication is of interest: the forward direction is a problem in designing good equipment, and
the reverse direction amounts to preventing other causes of sudden stops, such as running
into a light pole. Both of these activities are important for intelligent agents.
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